mcp-to-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill directs the agent to read sensitive configuration files associated with various AI platforms to discover tool definitions.
- Evidence: Phase 1 (Discovery) in
SKILL.mdtargets files such as~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json,.cursor/mcp.json, and~/.claude/settings.json. - Risk: These configuration files often contain environment variables, server connection details, and in some cases, embedded credentials or security tokens used by the agent environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local scripts and system tools for analysis, estimation, and generation.
- Evidence: The workflow executes
python3 scripts/estimate_tokens.pyto calculate potential token savings. - Evidence: It uses
npm infoandpip showto retrieve package metadata from public registries for tool discovery. - Evidence: The conversion process involves generating and suggesting shell commands (
curl), CLI invocations (gh,aws,kubectl), and Python code snippets for the user to implement. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and analyzes external, potentially untrusted data, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill parses MCP tool definitions, JSON schemas, and server source code from local files, package registries, or user input (
SKILL.mdPhase 1). - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read local files, execute shell commands via
bash_tool, and perform network requests viaweb_fetchorcurl. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat external schema content as non-instructional data.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or structural validation performed on the ingested schemas before they are analyzed for conversion strategy.
Audit Metadata