audit-mcp
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses highly sensitive configuration files such as
~/.claude.json,%USERPROFILE%\.claude.json, and system-levelmanaged-mcp.json. These files typically store plaintext API keys, access tokens, and server credentials for Model Context Protocol integrations, representing a high data exposure risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to run platform CLI commands includingclaude mcp listandclaude mcp getto retrieve live configuration data. The use of the shell for system introspection provides a mechanism that could be exploited if the agent context is compromised. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and processing
.mcp.jsonfiles from untrusted project roots and plugin directories. These external files could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate the behavior of themcp-auditororaudit-finding-validatorsubagents. - Ingestion points: Accesses
.mcp.jsonfiles in project and plugin scopes. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters are used to isolate untrusted configuration data from the agent's internal reasoning.
- Capability inventory: Uses
Bash,Read, andTasktools; invokes external subagents for auditing and validation. - Sanitization: No content validation or escaping is described for the configuration data prior to processing by subagents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata