Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection as it extracts and processes text from untrusted external PDF files.
- Ingestion points: PDF content is read via
pypdf,pdfplumber, andpypdfium2as described inSKILL.mdand implemented inscripts/extract_form_field_info.pyandscripts/extract_form_structure.py. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions for the agent to use delimiters or to treat the extracted text as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to execute shell commands (
qpdf,pdftotext,pdftk,magick) and has file system access to read and write multiple file types. - Sanitization: Absent. Extracted text is not sanitized or escaped before being returned to the agent context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to run several external command-line utilities.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandforms.mdinstruct the agent to use tools such aspdftotext,qpdf,pdftk, and ImageMagick (magick/convert) for PDF manipulation and image refinement. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on numerous third-party libraries for PDF and image processing.
- Evidence: References to
pypdf,pdfplumber,reportlab,pytesseract,pdf2image,pypdfium2,pillow,pandas,pdf-lib, andpdfjs-distare present across the scripts and documentation. These are well-known libraries from established maintainers.
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