skills/memtensor/skills-vote/xlsx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

xlsx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Runtime compilation and process injection of a custom shim library.
  • File: scripts/office/soffice.py
  • Evidence: The script contains an embedded C source string _SHIM_SOURCE that is written to a temporary file and compiled at runtime using gcc to create a shared library lo_socket_shim.so. This library is subsequently injected into the environment of subprocesses using the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to intercept and modify socket-related system calls for LibreOffice.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Execution of system binaries via subprocess calls to perform core functions.
  • Files: scripts/recalc.py, scripts/office/soffice.py, scripts/office/validators/redlining.py
  • Evidence: The skill invokes several external binaries, including soffice (LibreOffice) for spreadsheet formula recalculation, gcc for the runtime compilation of compatibility shims, and git for generating document differences during validation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection via untrusted data ingestion.
  • Ingestion points: spreadsheet files are read using pd.read_excel and load_workbook in scripts/recalc.py and snippets provided in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions or delimiters defined to prevent the agent from obeying natural language instructions that might be embedded within spreadsheet cells.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute arbitrary system commands (via the recalculation and compilation logic) and write to the local file system.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The scripts do not implement validation or escaping of the content extracted from external tabular files before it is processed or presented to the model.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 8, 2026, 06:21 AM