xlsx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Runtime compilation and process injection of a custom shim library.
- File: scripts/office/soffice.py
- Evidence: The script contains an embedded C source string
_SHIM_SOURCEthat is written to a temporary file and compiled at runtime usinggccto create a shared librarylo_socket_shim.so. This library is subsequently injected into the environment of subprocesses using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to intercept and modify socket-related system calls for LibreOffice. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Execution of system binaries via subprocess calls to perform core functions.
- Files: scripts/recalc.py, scripts/office/soffice.py, scripts/office/validators/redlining.py
- Evidence: The skill invokes several external binaries, including
soffice(LibreOffice) for spreadsheet formula recalculation,gccfor the runtime compilation of compatibility shims, andgitfor generating document differences during validation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection via untrusted data ingestion.
- Ingestion points: spreadsheet files are read using
pd.read_excelandload_workbookinscripts/recalc.pyand snippets provided inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions or delimiters defined to prevent the agent from obeying natural language instructions that might be embedded within spreadsheet cells.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute arbitrary system commands (via the recalculation and compilation logic) and write to the local file system.
- Sanitization: Absent. The scripts do not implement validation or escaping of the content extracted from external tabular files before it is processed or presented to the model.
Audit Metadata