meshy-3d-printing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes the official
meshy-clitool to perform its operations. It specifically instructs the agent to usenpm exec --package=meshy-cli@0.4.0if a local installation is missing, which fetches a pinned version of the vendor's package from the NPM registry. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of processing external data.
- Ingestion points: The agent ingests untrusted data from user-provided text prompts, image URLs, and external model files when creating or refining 3D assets, as detailed in
references/printing.mdandreferences/delivery.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or specific safety warnings to prevent the agent from interpreting instructions that might be embedded within user-supplied text or asset metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of executing shell commands via the
meshyCLI and performing file system write operations within a definedWORKSPACEdirectory, as described inreferences/setup.md. - Sanitization: The skill mitigates risks by requiring the use of structured data formats (
--format json) and validated schemas (--output-schema v1) for all CLI interactions, which prevents many common injection vectors into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata