meshy-3d-printing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes system commands to detect and launch 3D slicer applications.
- Evidence: Uses
subprocess.run,subprocess.Popen, andos.startfileinSKILL.mdto interact with software like OrcaSlicer, Bambu Studio, and PrusaSlicer. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads 3D model files from the vendor's infrastructure.
- Evidence: Uses the
requestslibrary to fetch OBJ and 3MF files fromassets.meshy.aias part of the model generation workflow. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection via the processing of untrusted user data.
- Ingestion points: User-provided text prompts and image URLs are interpolated into Python scripts in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the script templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for network requests (
requests), file system writes (open().write()), and command execution (subprocess) across its scripts. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the user-provided prompt or URL strings was detected before interpolation.
Audit Metadata