metengine-data-agent

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to interact with external APIs and system configurations.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md and references/core-runtime.md contain curl -sS https://agent.metengine.xyz/health.
  • Evidence: references/core-extended.md provides instructions to modify the user's crontab: 0 0 * * 0 curl -sL https://www.metengine.xyz/skill.md -o ~/.claude/agents/metengine-data-agent.md.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Downloads remote documentation and updated instruction files from vendor-controlled domains and GitHub.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md lists https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MetEngine/skill/main/references/docs-index.json as a source for remote fetching.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local configuration files used for storing cryptographic keys.
  • Evidence: references/core-extended.md instructs the agent to read ~/.config/solana/id.json to access the Solana wallet.
  • Evidence: The skill encourages maintaining a 'Session Memory' file at ~/.claude/agents/metengine-memory.md which stores system paths and client bootstrap code.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Implements a mechanism that overwrites the agent's primary instruction file with content fetched from a remote server, allowing for remote modification of the agent's behavior.
  • Evidence: references/core-extended.md defines a workflow to overwrite ~/.claude/agents/metengine-data-agent.md using curl from metengine.xyz.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and acting upon data from external analytics APIs.
  • Ingestion points: API responses from agent.metengine.xyz (referenced in SKILL.md and references/core-extended.md).
  • Boundary markers: None present in the instruction set to delimit untrusted API data.
  • Capability inventory: Shell execution (curl), file system writes (auto-update), and network access (fetch).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation for data returned from the analytics endpoints.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 29, 2026, 07:51 AM