forge-setup-project
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to perform specific file system operations during the migration process. Specifically, it executesrm -f CLAUDE.mdandln -sf AGENTS.md CLAUDE.mdto handle legacy compatibility symlinks. It also instructs the agent to performgit commitoperations to version control the generated documentation. These operations are limited in scope and directly related to the skill's stated purpose. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it reads and processes untrusted data from the project codebase to generate new context files.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
README.md,CLAUDE.md, existingAGENTS.mdfiles, and content within thedocs/directory of the project root (SKILL.md Step 1, Step 3). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of boundary markers or delimiters when interpolating data from these files into the agent's reasoning process.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bashfor command execution,Write/Editfor file modification, and Git for staging/committing changes. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content read from the project files before it is used to generate new instructions for the agent (Step 5, Step 6).
Audit Metadata