audit
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts and components execute system-level commands through subprocesses and shell scripts.
_cli/cli/dependencies.pyand_shared/tools/yaml_compat.pyusesubprocess.runto executepip installcommands._cli/cli/orchestrator/agent_caller.pyexecutes theclaudeCLI as a sub-process to perform analysis tasks._shared/tools/workflow-init.shand other shell utilities perform intensive file system and process operations.- The sub-agents (perspectives) are explicitly granted the
Bashtool, allowing them to execute arbitrary commands on the host system during the audit process. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automatically fetches and installs dependencies from external registries without user confirmation.
_cli/cli/dependencies.pyattempts to installtyper,rich,pydantic, andPyYAMLfrom PyPI if they are missing._shared/tools/dependency-utils.shcontains logic to install system-level packages using package managers likebrew,apt-get,apk,dnf, andyum.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The combination of automated dependency installation and the ability for agents to execute shell commands creates a significant risk of remote code execution if the sub-agents are influenced by malicious codebase content.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The script
_shared/tools/dependency-utils.shcontains commands that attempt to usesudoto install system packages. - Evidence:
sudo apt-get install -y "$package"andsudo yum install -y "$package"are called in themaw_install_system_packagefunction, which can be triggered automatically during the setup or execution of various tools. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to read and analyze codebase files. This provides a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Codebase files are read via
Read,Glob, andGrepin_cli/cli/orchestrator/agent_caller.py. - Boundary markers: Absent. The sub-agents are not explicitly instructed to treat file contents as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: Sub-agents have access to
Bash,WebFetch, andReadtools. - Sanitization: Absent. Content from the codebase is directly processed by the LLM sub-agents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata