tooluniverse-rnaseq-deseq2
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/convert_rds_to_csv.pyis vulnerable to command injection. It constructs an R script using f-strings with user-supplied file paths (rds_pathandcsv_path) and executes it viasubprocess.run(['Rscript', ...]). A malicious file path containing R syntax (e.g.,\"); system(\"rm -rf /\"); #) could lead to arbitrary code execution within the R environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on
subprocess.runto call system binaries likeRandRscript. This is a necessary functional component for RDS file handling but represents an increased security surface area. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
.env.templatefile prompts for multiple sensitive API keys (NVIDIA, OMIM, BioGrid, etc.) for the ToolUniverse platform. Although the template itself is safe, the skill is designed to manage and transmit these credentials to external vendor services. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
gseapy, which downloads gene set libraries from the Enrichr web service, and integrates withToolUniversefor gene annotation via external APIs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface through data ingestion:
- Ingestion points: Count matrices and metadata loaded via
scripts/load_count_matrix.pyandscripts/convert_rds_to_csv.py. - Boundary markers: None present; biological data is processed directly as pandas DataFrames.
- Capability inventory: File system access and subprocess execution (Rscript) in
scripts/convert_rds_to_csv.py. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on file paths before they are interpolated into the generated R script.
Audit Metadata