fui-module-development
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill implements a dynamic script loading mechanism in
references/default-function.mdvia theLoaderclass andloadScriptsfunction. This allows the application to fetch and execute arbitrary JavaScript from remote URLs at runtime, which is a classic RCE vector if URLs are manipulated. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The core action engine documented in
references/fastproject.mdandSKILL.mdsupports anEXEaction key. This is explicitly described as 'Raw JS' execution. This capability allows the agent or the processed metadata to execute arbitrary code within the application context, bypassing structured logic constraints. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (MEDIUM): The
SKILL.mdfile contains a 'Continuous Improvement' section that instructs the agent to 'Update: Modify existing guidelines/references immediately' based on user feedback. This creates a self-modifying instruction loop that can be exploited via indirect prompt injection to rewrite the agent's security protocols or operational rules. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill references tools like
save_moduleandpublish_modulefor moving code between local environments and servers. While intended for development, these tools lack explicit validation or restricted target lists in the documentation, potentially allowing unauthorized code exfiltration or ingestion. - [INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is designed to process external
module.jsonandscript.jsfiles while possessing high-privilege capabilities (network access viaajaxCALL, file operations viapublish_module, and code execution viaEXE). The lack of sanitization or boundary markers between processed data and the execution engine creates a high-risk surface for indirect injection attacks.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata