atscript-ui-forms
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
@atscript/ui-fnsplugin to compile annotation strings (e.g.,@ui.form.fn.label,@ui.form.fn.hidden, or@ui.form.validate) into JavaScript functions at runtime. This process involves thenew Functionconstructor through theFNPoolutility from the@prostojs/deserialize-fnpackage. Whilereferences/dynamic-fields.mdexplicitly warns developers that these strings must be author-controlled and never sourced from untrusted users, this provides a mechanism for dynamic code generation and execution within the agent's environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs the user to install several Node.js packages using
pnpmandnpx, including@atscript/core,@atscript/typescript,@atscript/ui,@atscript/vue-form, and@atscript/ui-fns. These are vendor-owned resources belonging to themoostjsdeveloper. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As a UI framework for agents, the skill establishes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the skill's context via the
formDataandformContextprops passed to the<AsForm>component. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define delimiters for separating user-provided data from agent instructions within the form context.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of performing network requests (e.g., querying API endpoints for foreign key lookups via
ValueHelpClient) and submitting form data to external services. - Sanitization: The
AsConsentArraycomponent includes sanitization logic that restricts markdown links in descriptions tohttp,https, andmailtoprotocols, mitigating some potential injection vectors in those fields.
Audit Metadata