atscript-ui-forms

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the @atscript/ui-fns plugin to compile annotation strings (e.g., @ui.form.fn.label, @ui.form.fn.hidden, or @ui.form.validate) into JavaScript functions at runtime. This process involves the new Function constructor through the FNPool utility from the @prostojs/deserialize-fn package. While references/dynamic-fields.md explicitly warns developers that these strings must be author-controlled and never sourced from untrusted users, this provides a mechanism for dynamic code generation and execution within the agent's environment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs the user to install several Node.js packages using pnpm and npx, including @atscript/core, @atscript/typescript, @atscript/ui, @atscript/vue-form, and @atscript/ui-fns. These are vendor-owned resources belonging to the moostjs developer.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As a UI framework for agents, the skill establishes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the skill's context via the formData and formContext props passed to the <AsForm> component.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define delimiters for separating user-provided data from agent instructions within the form context.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is capable of performing network requests (e.g., querying API endpoints for foreign key lookups via ValueHelpClient) and submitting form data to external services.
  • Sanitization: The AsConsentArray component includes sanitization logic that restricts markdown links in descriptions to http, https, and mailto protocols, mitigating some potential injection vectors in those fields.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 10:43 AM