clawflow-mvp
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requests the installation of a global NPM package
@muathzaher/clawflow. This package name contains a character substitution ('e' instead of 'i') compared to the provided author namemuathzahir, which is a strong indicator of typosquatting. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By instructing the agent to perform global installations and use
npxwith a potentially typosquatted package name, the skill enables the execution of remote code from an unverified source with elevated system permissions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves extensive use of shell commands to manage local processes and browser automation. It specifically includes system-level commands like
Stop-Processon Windows to terminate processes by PID, representing a high-power capability. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and acting upon data from external web applications (markers) and issue reports which could be used to manipulate the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(reading external data viaclawflow issue bundleandmarker ingestcommands) - Boundary markers: Absent
- Capability inventory:
SKILL.md(Full shell command execution and browser control viaagent-browser) - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify how it validates or sanitizes the content of issue bundles or markers before the agent processes them.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata