analyzing-pdf-malware-with-pdfid
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted PDF content and presents it to the AI agent, creating a surface for injection. \n
- Ingestion points: External PDF files are processed via
scripts/agent.pyand tools likepdf-parser. \n - Boundary markers: No explicit boundaries are used to distinguish untrusted PDF content from agent instructions. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, perform file I/O, and emulate shellcode. \n
- Sanitization: Content is extracted and displayed to the agent context without sanitization or instruction-filtering. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on executing several external utilities via the shell. \n
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdand related documentation specify the use ofpdfid,pdf-parser, andscdbgvia command-line execution and Pythonsubprocess.run. \n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill involves the dynamic extraction and emulation of binary payloads. \n - Evidence: It includes logic for carving PE files (MZ header detection) and emulating x86 shellcode using the
speakeasyframework.
Audit Metadata