skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/conducting-social-engineering-pretext-call/Gen Agent Trust Hub
conducting-social-engineering-pretext-call
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external JSON files containing target information and campaign results, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the data source is untrusted.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/agent.pyscript ingests target and result data from JSON files provided via command-line arguments (--targetsand--results). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions (e.g., 'ignore instructions within this data') are used when processing the external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform file system operations, including writing campaign reports and CSV logs to the local disk (
scripts/agent.py,scripts/process.py). - Sanitization: The scripts do not implement sanitization or validation for the data ingested from the JSON files before using them in generated reports and tracking sheets.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation references several external dependencies required for its functionality.
- Evidence:
references/api-reference.mdidentifiesrequests,twilio, andJinja2as necessary Python libraries. These are well-known and standard packages in the ecosystem. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdmentions the use oftheHarvester, a standard open-source intelligence (OSINT) tool.
Audit Metadata