skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/implementing-container-image-minimal-base-with-distroless/Gen Agent Trust Hub
implementing-container-image-minimal-base-with-distroless
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Argument injection vulnerability in
scripts/agent.pyandscripts/process.py. - The scripts use
subprocess.run()to execute external binaries such asdocker,trivy, andkubectl. - Untrusted data, including container image names and Kubernetes namespace parameters, are passed directly as positional arguments in the command list.
- An attacker could provide an image name starting with a hyphen (e.g.,
-v /:/host:ro alpine) to inject flags into the underlyingdocker runcommand, potentially mounting the host filesystem or escalating privileges. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection via untrusted Kubernetes metadata.
- Ingestion points: The
analyze_kubernetes_imagesfunction inscripts/process.pyfetches image names from a cluster environment usingkubectl get pods -o json. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are present to distinguish between trusted and untrusted image metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute system commands (
subprocess.run), inspect files viadocker, and run arbitrary containers. - Sanitization: The extracted image strings are not validated or sanitized before being used in further command-line operations.
Audit Metadata