skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/implementing-container-image-minimal-base-with-distroless/Gen Agent Trust Hub
implementing-container-image-minimal-base-with-distroless
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
scripts/agent.pyandscripts/process.pyutilize thesubprocessmodule to perform system calls todocker,trivy, andkubectl. These commands are used to inspect image metadata, scan for vulnerabilities, and query container statuses from a Kubernetes cluster. - Evidence:
subprocess.run()is used throughout both scripts to invoke CLI tools. - Security Evaluation: The implementation consistently uses argument lists rather than shell strings and avoids
shell=True, effectively mitigating risks of command injection from untrusted image names. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
scripts/process.pyscript identifies and processes container image names directly from Kubernetes cluster state, which constitutes an ingestion point for potentially untrusted data. - Ingestion points:
scripts/process.pyparses the output ofkubectl get pods -o jsonto extract image strings. - Boundary markers: None present for the extracted strings.
- Capability inventory: The extracted strings are passed as arguments to
docker inspectandtrivy imageviasubprocess.run. - Sanitization: While the strings are not sanitized, the use of list-based command execution prevents typical shell injection vectors. The risk is limited to potential LLM confusion if a malicious image name contains adversarial instructions intended for the agent's context.
Audit Metadata