skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/implementing-network-access-control-with-cisco-ise/Gen Agent Trust Hub
implementing-network-access-control-with-cisco-ise
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/agent.pyutilizessubprocess.runto invoke thecurlcommand-line tool. This is the primary mechanism for interacting with the Cisco ISE API. While the script passes arguments as a list to avoid shell injection, the reliance on external binary execution for network tasks is a sensitive pattern. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The automation script
scripts/agent.pyaccepts administrative credentials via command-line flags (--usernameand--password), making them visible in process monitoring tools on multi-user systems. Additionally, the documentation inSKILL.mdcontains hardcoded example passwords likeC0mpl3x$3cretKey!andCtsP@sswithin configuration snippets. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/agent.pyscript makes network requests to external URLs specified by the user at runtime. It explicitly includes the-k(insecure) flag in itscurlcommands, which disables SSL/TLS certificate verification. This bypasses a fundamental security control and exposes API communications to man-in-the-middle attacks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests data from external API responses (such as endpoint group names and session statuses) and includes them in the agent's context without sanitization.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/agent.py(viaise_requestandget_active_sessionscalls) - Boundary markers: Absent (external data is processed and printed without clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands)
- Capability inventory:
subprocess.run(available inscripts/agent.pyfor system interactions) - Sanitization: Absent (no validation or escaping of API-provided strings before inclusion in the report or logging output)
Audit Metadata