skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/implementing-pam-for-database-access/Gen Agent Trust Hub
implementing-pam-for-database-access
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/agent.pyusessubprocess.runto execute database CLI tools likepsql,mysql, andsqlcmd. These executions use user-provided inputs for hostnames and credentials, representing a broad surface for command execution. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
agent.pyscript accepts database passwords via the--admin-passwordcommand-line argument. For MySQL and MSSQL, these passwords are then passed as plaintext arguments to the underlying system commands (e.g.,-p{password}and-P password), which makes them visible to any user or logging tool monitoring active processes on the machine. This is a significant best-practice violation for secret handling. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external database user tables which could be exploited by an attacker to influence agent behavior if the output is processed by an LLM.
- Ingestion points: Database user names and privilege statuses are retrieved in the
query_db_usersfunction withinscripts/agent.py. - Boundary markers: None; the external data is directly aggregated into a JSON report without delimiters or instruction-blocking warnings.
- Capability inventory: The script can execute system commands and write files to the local disk via the
--outputargument. - Sanitization: None; the raw database output is not sanitized or escaped before inclusion in the final report.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy between the author name 'mahipal' in
SKILL.mdand the copyright holder 'mukul975' in theLICENSEfile. This inconsistency is misleading regarding the skill's provenance.
Audit Metadata