skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/implementing-security-chaos-engineering/Gen Agent Trust Hub
implementing-security-chaos-engineering
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/agent.pyperforms highly sensitive AWS operations using theboto3library. - It intentionally opens security group ingress to the public internet (
0.0.0.0/0) on port 22 within theexperiment_open_security_groupfunction. - It disables CloudTrail logging via the
ct.stop_loggingcall inexperiment_stop_cloudtrail, which can be used to blind security monitoring and auditing. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
experiment_create_admin_userfunction inscripts/agent.pycreates a new IAM user and attaches theAdministratorAccessmanaged policy, granting full administrative control over the target AWS account. - [PERSISTENCE]: The creation of a new administrative IAM user is a classic technique for maintaining persistent access to a cloud environment, which the skill facilitates through its experiment logic.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features a vulnerability surface where it ingests and processes untrusted data from external security services.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/agent.pyreads data from the outputs ofgd.list_findings,config_client.get_compliance_details_by_config_rule, andcw.describe_alarms. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are present when the agent processes these API outputs.
- Capability inventory: The script possesses broad administrative capabilities across IAM, EC2, CloudTrail, Config, GuardDuty, and CloudWatch.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the data received from these external AWS services before it is used to influence the agent's decision logic.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata