skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/implementing-security-chaos-engineering/Gen Agent Trust Hub
implementing-security-chaos-engineering
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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs high-risk modifications to AWS infrastructure settings.\n
scripts/agent.py: Theexperiment_open_security_groupfunction grants unrestricted SSH access (0.0.0.0/0) to security groups viaec2.authorize_security_group_ingress.\nscripts/agent.py: Theexperiment_create_admin_userfunction creates a new IAM user and attaches theAdministratorAccessmanaged policy.\nscripts/agent.py: Theexperiment_stop_cloudtrailfunction disables logging for AWS CloudTrail trails, potentially blinding security monitoring.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes theboto3library from Amazon Web Services to interact with cloud services.\nscripts/agent.py: Imports and uses theboto3Python package to execute API calls for resource manipulation and monitoring verification.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection via unsanitized data ingestion (Category 8).\n- Ingestion points: Command-line arguments
--sg-id,--trail-name, and--profileinscripts/agent.pyare used to target specific AWS resources.\n - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing logic.\n
- Capability inventory: Includes the ability to modify security groups, IAM users, policies, and CloudTrail logging status across an AWS account.\n
- Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization is performed on the resource identifiers before they are passed to AWS API calls.
Audit Metadata