implementing-security-chaos-engineering

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/agent.py performs highly sensitive AWS operations using the boto3 library.
  • It intentionally opens security group ingress to the public internet (0.0.0.0/0) on port 22 within the experiment_open_security_group function.
  • It disables CloudTrail logging via the ct.stop_logging call in experiment_stop_cloudtrail, which can be used to blind security monitoring and auditing.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The experiment_create_admin_user function in scripts/agent.py creates a new IAM user and attaches the AdministratorAccess managed policy, granting full administrative control over the target AWS account.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The creation of a new administrative IAM user is a classic technique for maintaining persistent access to a cloud environment, which the skill facilitates through its experiment logic.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features a vulnerability surface where it ingests and processes untrusted data from external security services.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/agent.py reads data from the outputs of gd.list_findings, config_client.get_compliance_details_by_config_rule, and cw.describe_alarms.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are present when the agent processes these API outputs.
  • Capability inventory: The script possesses broad administrative capabilities across IAM, EC2, CloudTrail, Config, GuardDuty, and CloudWatch.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the data received from these external AWS services before it is used to influence the agent's decision logic.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 03:45 PM