skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/integrating-sast-into-github-actions-pipeline/Gen Agent Trust Hub
integrating-sast-into-github-actions-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration scripts
scripts/agent.pyandscripts/process.pyusesubprocess.runto execute external security tools (semgrepandcodeql). - Evidence:
subprocess.run(cmd, ...)is used inscripts/agent.py(line 18) andscripts/process.py(lines 67, 100). - The scripts correctly use list-based arguments instead of shell strings, which mitigates standard shell injection vulnerabilities. The arguments are derived from CLI parameters provided to the scripts.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it parses findings from external security tools without specific sanitization beyond truncation.
- Ingestion points: The
parse_sariffunction inscripts/process.py(line 123) andparse_semgrep_resultsinscripts/agent.py(line 30) read JSON data generated by scanning tools. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted data fields (like vulnerability messages) from the agent's logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands and write files.
- Sanitization: Finding messages are truncated to specific lengths but are not sanitized for potential injection patterns before being included in consolidated reports.
- [Metadata Poisoning]: There is a minor inconsistency in author metadata between the skill frontmatter and the license file.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdlists the author as 'mahipal', while theLICENSEfile attributes copyright to 'mukul975'.
Audit Metadata