integrating-sast-into-github-actions-pipeline

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration scripts scripts/agent.py and scripts/process.py use subprocess.run to execute external security tools (semgrep and codeql).
  • Evidence: subprocess.run(cmd, ...) is used in scripts/agent.py (line 18) and scripts/process.py (lines 67, 100).
  • The scripts correctly use list-based arguments instead of shell strings, which mitigates standard shell injection vulnerabilities. The arguments are derived from CLI parameters provided to the scripts.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it parses findings from external security tools without specific sanitization beyond truncation.
  • Ingestion points: The parse_sarif function in scripts/process.py (line 123) and parse_semgrep_results in scripts/agent.py (line 30) read JSON data generated by scanning tools.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted data fields (like vulnerability messages) from the agent's logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands and write files.
  • Sanitization: Finding messages are truncated to specific lengths but are not sanitized for potential injection patterns before being included in consolidated reports.
  • [Metadata Poisoning]: There is a minor inconsistency in author metadata between the skill frontmatter and the license file.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md lists the author as 'mahipal', while the LICENSE file attributes copyright to 'mukul975'.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 9, 2026, 07:13 PM