skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/scanning-infrastructure-with-nessus/Gen Agent Trust Hub
scanning-infrastructure-with-nessus
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation in
SKILL.mdcontains hardcoded credentials within acurlexample ("password":"password"). Providing static credentials in configuration examples, even as placeholders, increases the risk of them being deployed in production environments verbatim. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]:
SKILL.mdprovides instructions to executesudo systemctlfor managing system services. While functional for the intended use case, it requires the agent to operate with elevated privileges. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Both
scripts/agent.pyandscripts/process.pyperform network operations to the Nessus REST API. These scripts include logic to explicitly disable SSL/TLS certificate verification (verify=FalseandSKIP_TLS_VERIFY=true), exposing authentication tokens and sensitive scan data to potential man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data during scan result parsing.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/process.pyparses.nessusXML files, andscripts/agent.pyprocesses JSON responses from the Nessus API. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands were found in the reporting logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform network requests and write to the local filesystem (
nessus_report.json, HTML reports). - Sanitization: While
defusedxmlis used to prevent XML entity attacks, there is no sanitization of the content extracted from scan results (e.g., service banners or plugin output) before it is interpolated into reports. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if an attacker can manipulate the output of a scanned service.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata