printing-press-import
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches files from a remote repository located at
github.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-library. - It uses
gh apito download theregistry.jsonandmanifest.jsonmetadata files. - The
import-fetch.shscript performs a shallowgit cloneto retrieve the source code of the requested CLI tool. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill compiles and executes code retrieved from the remote GitHub repository.
- The skill runs
go build ./...on the downloaded files to create a local binary. - It then executes the resulting binary via the
./bin/${API_SLUG}-pp-cli doctorcommand to verify the import. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to run several local scripts that perform impactful file system operations. import-place.shusesrm -rfto delete existing content at the target library and manuscripts paths before moving the new files.import-rewrite.shusesperlto perform in-place modification of source files (.go,.yaml,.md) to revert module paths.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through unverified data fetched from the remote repository.
- Ingestion points: Metadata such as the CLI
nameanddescriptionare retrieved from the remoteregistry.jsonfile. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are used when displaying these fields to the user or incorporating them into the agent's reasoning.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including the ability to build and execute arbitrary binaries and perform recursive file system deletions.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the remote metadata before it is processed or presented.
Audit Metadata