pp-instacart
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The "Backfill Flow" instructs the agent to download three JavaScript files (
dumper.js,extract-one.js, andexport-jsonl.js) from a remote GitHub repository and execute them in the context of the user's browser session using themcp__claude-in-chrome__javascript_tool. This technique executes remote code within a sensitive, authenticated web environment. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The CLI tool is designed to harvest session cookies directly from the user's Chrome browser profile via the
instacart auth logincommand. These credentials are saved to a local configuration file at~/.config/instacart/session.json, creating a risk of credential exposure if the local environment is compromised. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires installing a third-party binary tool. It provides instructions to download and install
instacart-pp-clivia npm (@mvanhorn/printing-press) or by usinggo installfrom the author's GitHub repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily relies on the
Bashtool to run theinstacart-pp-clibinary, manage software installation, and perform file system operations such as importing order history from JSONL files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing and caching external data from Instacart order history.
- Ingestion points:
instacart-orders.jsonl(SKILL.md) - Boundary markers: Absent.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
Bashtool for cart modifications and product searches. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the ingested JSONL content is described in the provided instructions.
Audit Metadata