pp-slack

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of the slack-pp-cli and slack-pp-mcp tools.
  • Binaries are downloaded from the author's GitHub repository (github.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-library) via go install.
  • An installer is fetched from the NPM registry using npx -y @mvanhorn/printing-press.
  • These external resources originate from the identified skill author's infrastructure.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local command execution to perform Slack operations.
  • Executes slack-pp-cli for tasks such as searching messages, listing users, and analyzing workspace activity.
  • Invokes claude mcp add to register the MCP server with the agent environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its interaction with external workspace data.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via slack-pp-cli commands that read Slack message history, channel content, and thread data (e.g., search, digest, sync).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or security headers to isolate Slack data from the agent's core instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute further CLI commands and network requests based on the content it parses from Slack.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of data sanitization or instruction filtering applied to the messages retrieved from the Slack API.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 8, 2026, 07:21 PM