pp-substack
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download and install binaries using
npxfrom the@mvanhornnpm scope andgo installfrom themvanhornGitHub organization repositories. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves fetching and executing remote code via
npxandgo installto set up thesubstack-pp-cliandsubstack-pp-mcptools. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The CLI tool includes a built-in
--deliver webhook:<url>feature that enables the transmission of potentially sensitive publication data, analytics, and subscriber information to arbitrary external URLs. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The tool accesses sensitive authentication data by reading Substack session cookies directly from the user's Chrome browser storage via the
auth login --chromecommand. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted external content from Substack (posts, notes, and comments) through various synchronization and search commands.
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled into the agent's context via
grep,portfolio sync,inbox home, andposts list-published(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill does not specify the use of delimiters or explicit instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the retrieved content.
- Capability inventory: The agent retains the ability to execute shell commands (via the
bashtool) and perform local file system operations. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the content retrieved from Substack before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata