babysit-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill fetches external, potentially untrusted data from GitHub PR reviews and comments via API calls (
gh apiand GraphQL). It then instructs the agent to 'Classify and act' on this content. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Step 3b and 3c) processes comment bodies fromreviewThreads, top-level review bodies, and issue comments. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or specific warnings to the agent to treat the fetched text as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory:
SKILL.md(Step 4) grants the agent the ability to modify local code (gt modify --commit), restack branches (gt restack), and push changes to the remote repository (gt submit --stack). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of content filtering or validation before the comment data is passed to the language model for classification and action.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Extensive use of local CLI tools. The skill relies on the Graphite (
gt) and GitHub (gh) command-line interfaces to perform its core functions. It executes commands such asgt ls,gt checkout,gt modify, andgt submitin a loop. These high-privilege operations are directly influenced by the data ingested from PR comments, increasing the risk profile of the skill.
Audit Metadata