backlog-md
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it requires the agent to ingest and follow instructions from an external task tracking system.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads external task data (titles, descriptions, acceptance criteria, and notes) via
backlog task <id> --plainas instructed inSKILL.mdandreferences/task-workflow.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or safety warnings to treat task content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions that might contradict the agent's core guidelines.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted permission to execute
backlogCLI commands and is expected to perform broader "Code implementation" (referenced inSKILL.md) based on the task data it reads. - Sanitization: No validation or filtering is applied to the task data before the agent processes and acts on it.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality is built around the execution of the
backlogCLI tool. - The agent is instructed to use a variety of subcommands (create, edit, search, list) to interact with the task database.
- While this is the intended use of the skill, it represents a command execution surface that processes arguments derived from external task content.
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