diffity-learn
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill attempts to install the
diffitypackage globally usingnpm install -g diffityif it is not found on the system during the setup phase. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to manage the environment, including
git init,mkdir, and variousdiffityCLI operations. It uses the user-providedtopicargument to construct file system paths (e.g.,learn-<topic>), which presents a risk of command or argument injection if the input contains shell metacharacters. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a
build-agentsubagent that is explicitly instructed to generate, run, and verify code. Executing dynamically generated code at runtime is a significant security risk if the generation process is influenced by malicious input. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from user-authored code files and project configurations to provide reviews and plan lessons.
- Ingestion points: User-provided code in
lesson-*/user-*/src/and thelearn.jsonstate file. - Boundary markers: None are specified when interpolating user data or file content into subagent prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands, spawn subagents with custom prompts, and write to the local file system.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of external content before it is processed by the AI agents.
Audit Metadata