patent-draft-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
npx -ywithinreferences/mcporter.jsonto download and execute MCP server packages (@kunihiros/google-patents-mcpandexa-mcp-server) from the official npm registry. This is a standard mechanism for tool extension but involves runtime execution of code from a remote repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
bashandpython3to perform environment initialization, manage temporary work directories, and orchestrate tool calls through themcporterCLI. These operations are scoped to the skill's operational requirements. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted user technical descriptions and processes them through multiple sub-agents with tool-execution capabilities.
- Ingestion points: User input is saved to
${WORK_DIR}/00_input/input.mdand read by all subsequent agent phases. - Boundary markers: The prompts in
references/prompts/define clear input/output file scopes but lack robust delimiters (e.g., XML tags or specific 'ignore embedded instructions' markers) to isolate user-supplied content from agent directives. - Capability inventory: Agents have access to
bashfor file management and themcportertool for network-based patent and web searches. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or validation of the input Markdown before it is passed to sub-agents for analysis and text generation.
Audit Metadata