activation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses coercive language and explicit override markers designed to bypass the agent's internal reasoning and safety guardrails.
- The
<CRITICAL-OVERRIDE>block mandates that skill invocation is 'absolute' and 'cannot be reasoned away or deferred'. - The 'Guardrails' section explicitly instructs the agent to disregard its own internal thoughts (e.g., 'This is a straightforward question') as 'warning signs' of rationalization, effectively attempting to override the model's native cognitive checks.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'YoloMode' feature defines several trigger phrases that cause the agent to skip confirmation prompts and compress workflows, creating an attack surface where external content could trigger autonomous behavior.
- Ingestion points: Trigger phrases like 'just go', 'skip the questions', or 'auto-pick' are detected in user messages or potentially any text the agent processes (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to ignore these triggers if they appear within untrusted data such as file contents or API responses.
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates file reading (Read tool) and tool execution (Skill tool), which can be autonomously driven when 'YoloMode' is active.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization or validation logic to distinguish between a genuine user directive and a phrase embedded in processed data.
Audit Metadata