codex-code-review
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to execute the
codexcommand with the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag. This flag is explicitly intended to disable security isolation mechanisms (like the bwrap sandbox), which increases the risk of unauthorized system access. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of a Node.js package
@openai/codex. This package name does not correspond to an official OpenAI utility and represents a supply chain risk, especially given the deceptive claim of supporting a 'GPT-5.4' model. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its processing of untrusted data:
- Ingestion points: User-supplied input for 'scope', 'focus areas', and 'context summary' in Phase 1 and 2.
- Boundary markers: None; the user input is directly interpolated into the Codex prompt.
- Capability inventory: The agent uses
Bashto executecodex execand hasReadaccess to the filesystem. - Sanitization: None; user input is not escaped or validated before being passed to the shell or the secondary model.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill passes a dynamically constructed prompt string as a shell argument. If the agent fails to properly escape shell metacharacters in the user-provided focus areas, it could lead to command injection on the host system.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata