security-threat-model
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several local Python scripts (e.g.,
scripts/scan-threat-surface.py,scripts/scan-supply-chain.py,scripts/sanitize-learning-db.py) executed via theBashtool. The source code for these scripts is not part of the skill package, which prevents a full security verification of the operations they perform. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill explicitly targets and reads highly sensitive system locations including
~/.claude/settings.json,~/.ssh/,~/.aws/, and various.envfiles. While intended for security auditing, this broad access to credentials and configurations poses a significant data exposure risk if the skill or its scripts were to be subverted. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection during Phase 5 (Threat Model Synthesis).
- Ingestion points: Data from
security/surface-report.json,security/supply-chain-findings.json, andsecurity/learning-db-report.jsonis loaded directly into the LLM context in Phase 5. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to the model to distinguish between legitimate audit findings and potentially malicious instructions embedded within the data being scanned.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Read,Write,Bash,Grep,Glob, andEdittools as defined in the YAML frontmatter. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of findings before they are processed by the LLM for the final report.
Audit Metadata