obsidian-granola

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes shell commands using dynamic content fetched from an external source.
  • Evidence: In SKILL.md, the instruction in Section 6 directs the agent to execute obsidian open file="[Meeting Title]", where [Meeting Title] is derived from meeting metadata retrieved via the Granola MCP.
  • Risk: This patterns creates a command injection vulnerability if a meeting title contains shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks, semicolons, or pipes).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from meeting transcripts and summaries.
  • Ingestion points: Meeting data is retrieved using mcp_granola_get_meetings and mcp_granola_get_meeting_transcript in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not include boundary markers or explicit directions to the agent to ignore instructions that might be embedded within the meeting content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to obsidian read, obsidian open, and general shell execution/file writing capabilities (as seen in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the transcript content before it is interpolated into the Obsidian note templates and saved to the filesystem.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to use shell commands (bash) to interact with the Obsidian CLI for opening files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 8, 2026, 01:58 PM