flow-develop

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes shell and Python scripts, such as orchestrate.sh and search.py, by directly interpolating user-provided task descriptions and prompts into command-line arguments. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the underlying scripts do not properly sanitize these inputs.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface due to its synthesis of external and local data.\n
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested from user implementation requests, project state files (.octo/STATE.md), and synthesis output from external providers (Codex, Gemini) stored in ~/.claude-octopus/results/.\n
  • Boundary markers: The workflow does not utilize explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when passing user-provided content to the orchestrate.sh script or other sub-processes.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities, including executing shell commands, reading/writing files, and orchestrating subagents via SendMessage.\n
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of external content before it is used for command execution or prompt construction.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 7, 2026, 03:28 PM