octopus-research
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses an 'Execution Contract' with high-pressure language ('CRITICAL', 'MANDATORY', 'HARD-GATE') designed to override the agent's default reasoning and force the execution of a specific tool, bypassing standard autonomous decision-making.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local bash script at
${HOME}/.claude-octopus/plugin/scripts/orchestrate.shand passes potentially unsanitized user input ('<user's research question>') into the command line. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on an external, unverifiable script ('orchestrate.sh') located in a hidden directory that is not part of the skill distribution. This allows the skill to execute opaque logic outside the visibility of the security analysis.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface detected through the processing of external synthesis reports.
- Ingestion points: Reads files from
~/.claude-octopus/results/probe-synthesis-*.mdwhich are generated from external web content. - Boundary markers: The skill refers to a 'skill-security-framing.md' file for protection, but this file is missing from the skill package.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
bash), file system searches (find), and file reading (cat). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the synthesized content is present in the provided instructions.
Audit Metadata