skill-factory
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell scripts from a non-standard location in the user's home directory (
${HOME}/.claude-octopus/plugin/scripts/). These scripts includestate-manager.shandorchestrate.sh, which perform workflow management and project orchestration. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In Step 4.5, the skill dynamically constructs a shell command to spawn a sub-agent. This command includes the full contents of a user-provided specification file interpolated into a string literal, which is then executed via
orchestrate.sh. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it reads untrusted data from a specification file and injects it directly into a prompt for a 'QA adversary' sub-agent.
- Ingestion points: Content of the file at
<spec_path>(SKILL.md, Step 4.5). - Boundary markers: None. The content is placed directly under a 'SPECIFICATION:' header.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for shell command execution, file system navigation, and interaction with external CLI providers (
codex,agy). - Sanitization: None detected. The raw file content is assigned to a variable and passed to a sub-shell command.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires and checks for the presence of external CLI tools
codexandagy(Antigravity CLI), which are used for scenario generation and model challenges. These tools must be pre-installed and are not managed by the skill's own package structure.
Audit Metadata