dry-principle

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and review arbitrary code files across the entire project (globs: '**/*.*'). This creates a vulnerability surface where the AI agent could be manipulated by malicious instructions embedded in the code it is reviewing.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads file content using the Read tool for any file matching the global glob pattern.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to help the agent distinguish between code to be reviewed and potential malicious instructions within that code.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to use Read, Write, and Edit tools, meaning a successful injection could result in unauthorized file modifications.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or instruction-filtering for the ingested code.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The SKILL.md frontmatter contains fields such as verified: true and trust_score: 100. These are non-standard, self-assigned attributes that attempt to project an authoritative status that may not be externally validated.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions include a 'Memory Protocol' and a warning ('ASSUME INTERRUPTION') that attempt to override the agent's standard context handling. It instructs the agent to prioritize a specific memory file and follow a manual state-management loop, which is a form of meta-instruction injection.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The SKILL.md file explicitly instructs the agent to execute a shell command (cat .claude/context/memory/learnings.md) to retrieve state. While the command itself is limited to reading a specific file, the pattern of embedding mandatory shell execution within instructions is a security concern.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 08:03 PM