llm-council
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly direct the agent to execute shell commands with high-risk flags:node .claude/skills/omega-cursor-cli/scripts/ask-cursor.mjs "$PROMPT" --yolo --trust. The--yoloand--trustflags are known to disable human-in-the-loop confirmations for AI-driven actions, allowing the model to perform potentially destructive file modifications or command executions without oversight. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's deliberation protocol creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by design.
- Ingestion points: The raw user-supplied
$PROMPTis passed to multiple models, and the resulting outputs are then used as input for 'Peer Review' and 'Chairman' agents. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or boundary markers (such as XML tags or explicit 'ignore instructions' prefixes) used when interpolating model responses into subsequent stages.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bash,Read, andWritetools, performs file system operations in.claude/context/tmp/, and optionally executesgit worktreecommands to modify code repositories. - Sanitization: No validation, sanitization, or escaping is performed on the data flowing between the different models, allowing a single malicious or manipulated model output to compromise the entire council deliberation process.
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