graph-query
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Detected an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where untrusted data from the knowledge graph enters the agent's context.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from the Neo4j database (reports, research, and market data) in
scripts/run_query.pyvia thequery()function and printed to standard output. - Boundary markers: None. Retrieved content is printed directly to the terminal without delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat the content as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill is permitted to use
Bashto executepython3scripts as specified in theallowed-toolssection ofSKILL.md. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or instruction-escaping for the data retrieved from the knowledge graph.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
Bash(python3 *)to execute its internal query logic. This is an expected pattern for local script-based skills and is scoped to the skill's specific directory.
Audit Metadata