investment-note

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill contains a hardcoded absolute file path in SKILL.md (/Users/kikuchihiroyuki/stock-skills/...) which exposes the local file system structure and the username of the developer.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The execution logic in SKILL.md interpolates $ARGUMENTS directly into a shell command (python3 ... $ARGUMENTS). While common in agent skills, this pattern can be a vector for command injection if the platform does not strictly sanitize or escape shell characters in the provided arguments.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and store untrusted text through the --content parameter, which is later retrieved to influence the agent's context.
  • Ingestion points: The save command in SKILL.md and manage_note.py accepts arbitrary user-supplied text for the --content argument.
  • Boundary markers: None. Stored content is interpolated into the context without delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to Bash(python3 *) via allowed-tools.
  • Sanitization: There is no visible sanitization, escaping, or validation of the --content text in the manage_note.py wrapper. The skill documentation explicitly states that stored notes are used to "reinforce the context" and influence subsequent operations (KIK-466), creating a feedback loop where malicious instructions in a note could affect future agent behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 3, 2026, 12:24 PM