investment-note
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill contains a hardcoded absolute file path in
SKILL.md(/Users/kikuchihiroyuki/stock-skills/...) which exposes the local file system structure and the username of the developer. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The execution logic in
SKILL.mdinterpolates$ARGUMENTSdirectly into a shell command (python3 ... $ARGUMENTS). While common in agent skills, this pattern can be a vector for command injection if the platform does not strictly sanitize or escape shell characters in the provided arguments. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and store untrusted text through the
--contentparameter, which is later retrieved to influence the agent's context. - Ingestion points: The
savecommand inSKILL.mdandmanage_note.pyaccepts arbitrary user-supplied text for the--contentargument. - Boundary markers: None. Stored content is interpolated into the context without delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash(python3 *)viaallowed-tools. - Sanitization: There is no visible sanitization, escaping, or validation of the
--contenttext in themanage_note.pywrapper. The skill documentation explicitly states that stored notes are used to "reinforce the context" and influence subsequent operations (KIK-466), creating a feedback loop where malicious instructions in a note could affect future agent behavior.
Audit Metadata