cc-changelog
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a local shell script
fetch-cc-changelog.shlocated in the project's scripts directory. It passes parameters such as--set={latest}where{latest}is a variable populated from external changelog data. This creates a potential command injection vector if the external source provides malicious shell metacharacters that are not sanitized before being passed to the bash command. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external changelog content to drive its analysis and filesystem operations.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads the output of the
fetch-cc-changelog.shscript, which contains external data from the Claude Code changelog. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define any delimiters or provide warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the changelog data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell scripts, perform recursive
grepsearches across theplugins/elixir-phoenix/directory, and modify project files likereference_cc_source_internals.md. - Sanitization: There is no indication of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the external changelog text before it is used to influence the agent's logic or filesystem commands.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: As part of its mapping logic, the skill uses strings extracted from external changelog entries to perform recursive searches across sensitive plugin components. This includes the hooks configuration (
hooks.json), all agent frontmatter files, and internal memory files, which could lead to the exposure of sensitive internal project structure or configuration based on external prompts.
Audit Metadata