topic-pulse
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
obsidian vault info=pathcommand to programmatically determine the file system location of the user's knowledge base. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: During the research phase, the agent extracts keywords and phrases from the user's private vault notes and uses them to perform external web searches. This creates a data flow where potentially sensitive topical interests or internal project names are transmitted to search engines and LLM providers.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from the vault.
- Ingestion points: Files are read from
Clippings/,Daily Notes/,Projects/,Coding/,Meetings/, andTopics/folders as specified inSKILL.md(Phases 0 and 1). TheClippings/folder is particularly high-risk as it typically contains raw content saved from external websites. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or protective framing to isolate vault content from the agent's internal logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system read/write access, the ability to execute shell commands via the Obsidian CLI, and network access for web research (Phase 3).
- Sanitization: No validation or escaping mechanisms are applied to the ingested content before it is processed by the model to determine future actions.
Audit Metadata