transcribe-meeting
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/vad.pyscript usestorch.hub.loadto download and execute code from a third-party GitHub repository (snakers4/silero-vad) at runtime for voice activity detection. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill programmatically retrieves sensitive API keys and tokens (
OPENAI_API_KEY,HF_TOKEN) from the user's 1Password vault via theopCLI inscripts/transcribe.shandscripts/vad.py. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow performs numerous shell operations across fifteen different scripts, including system-level hardware management via
udisksctl mountinscripts/find-recordings.shand extensive use of external binaries likeffmpeg,rclone, andyoutubeuploader. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/download-gdrive.shscript usesgdownto download content from arbitrary Google Drive URLs provided as input to the workflow. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it processes untrusted audio transcripts and uses them to generate summaries and action items. Since the agent has the capability to write to the vault and access the network, instructions embedded in recorded speech could potentially trigger unintended actions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
scripts/transcribe.sh, the skill can execute a user-provided Python binary via theOBSIDIAN_VAD_VENVenvironment variable, which constitutes dynamic execution from a computed path.
Audit Metadata