build-docs
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The bash scripts
scripts/github.shandscripts/url.shconstruct file system paths using the$version_labelargument derived from user input without validation. This allows for potential path traversal, as operations likerm -rfandmkdir -pare performed on paths likevault/packages/$name/$version_label. An attacker could potentially delete or overwrite files outside the intended directory by providing a manipulated version string (e.g.,../../). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content from external GitHub repositories and URLs using
gitandcurlbased on configurations in thevault/configs/directory. This is used to retrieve documentation that is later processed into new agent skills. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill generates new
SKILL.mdfiles from downloaded documentation, creating a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection. - Ingestion points: External markdown files are downloaded into
vault/packages/{name}/{version}/contents/viascripts/github.shandscripts/url.sh. - Boundary markers: None. The skill does not use delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands in the source documentation when generating new skill definitions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses subagents to create new
SKILL.mdfiles and provides commands (olore link,olore install) to activate the generated skills in the agent context. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the downloaded content before it is incorporated into the generated skill files, which could allow malicious instructions in the source documentation to compromise the agent.
Audit Metadata