opensearch-skills
Audited by Socket on Oct 13, 2026
4 alerts found:
Anomalyx2Securityx2SUSPICIOUS. The core OpenSearch functionality is coherent and mostly documentation-driven, but the skill increases risk by instructing transitive installation of additional skills and by auto-modifying MCP config to add external servers. Credential handling examples are broader than ideal, yet there is no clear evidence of covert exfiltration or malware in the provided content.
The code appears to be an OpenSearch connection and local-development bootstrap utility, not malware. Its main security concerns are insecure hardcoded default credentials, plaintext connection fallback, disabling the OpenSearch security plugin for bootstrapped containers, exposed Docker ports, mutable Docker image selection, and possible credential exposure through subprocess arguments. These behaviors could expose a development or misconfigured production system, but there is no clear evidence of intentional malicious activity or data exfiltration.
No clear malicious behavior is present. The code is a straightforward Docker startup script, but it has notable security risks: a hardcoded administrator password, credential disclosure in output, mutable `latest` image usage, broad port exposure, and disabled TLS verification. Use a pinned image digest, inject a securely generated password, avoid printing credentials, bind ports to localhost where appropriate, and validate certificates.
The code is a local document-evaluation utility with no evident malware, exfiltration, or backdoor behavior. Its main security risk is unsanitized index_name path construction, which can enable unauthorized filesystem reads and verdict-file writes when the value is externally controllable. Validate index_name as a safe identifier, resolve and enforce containment under STATUS_DIR, and correct `return Non` to `return None`. Malformed input can also cause failures during chunk loading.