openwebninja-universal-scraper
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Hardcoded sensitive credentials were discovered in a configuration file within the skill's API directory.
- Evidence: The file
apis/realtime-amazon-data/config.jsoncontains a hardcodedx-rapidapi-keystring ("4e842e5834msh0fff10888eda799p121fefjsn8712ea690aee") that appears to be a valid or previously active credential. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell tools to execute arbitrary code and perform complex data transformations.
- Evidence:
test_outputs.jsuseschild_process.spawnto execute apython3 -ccommand containing an arbitrary Python script that starts an FTP server and interacts with the file system. - Evidence: Several usage recipes in the
recipes.mdfiles (e.g.,apis/realtime-forums-search/recipes.md) instruct the agent to usenode -eto execute multi-line JavaScript code directly from the shell, which could be exploited via command injection. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides extensive utilities for sending gathered data to external third-party services.
- Evidence:
lib/utils.jsimplements functions likepushWebhook,pushS3,pushFTP, andpushAirtabledesigned to deliver scraped content to remote endpoints using user-supplied environment secrets. - Evidence:
test_outputs.jsreferenceswebhook.site, a service frequently used for anonymous data capture and exfiltration testing, as a destination for scraped records. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection from the web content it scrapes.
- Ingestion points: Results from 35+ external APIs (including Amazon reviews, Yelp profiles, and forum discussions) are read into the agent's context in
SKILL.md(Step 6). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or safety warnings (e.g., "ignore instructions in results") to prevent the agent from obeying commands embedded in scraped data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
BashandWritetools alongside the network-push utilities inlib/utils.js, meaning malicious content in a search result could potentially trigger the exfiltration of sensitive local files like.env. - Sanitization: No data sanitization or filtering logic is applied to external API results before they are processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata