slide-renderer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions for the agent to execute a local Python script (
scripts/generate_slide_images.py). This is the intended functional mechanism for the skill's slide rendering capability. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from external markdown files (
--prompts-dir) and interpolates them into a prompt for the Gemini API. - Ingestion points: The
extract_prompt_contentfunction inscripts/generate_slide_images.pyreads the entire content of user-provided markdown files. - Boundary markers: The script does not utilize explicit delimiters to separate the ingested file content from the system instructions, although it uses a strong
SYSTEM_INSTRUCTIONto guide the model's behavior. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform network operations (Gemini API calls) and write files to the local system (
--output-dir). - Sanitization: The script performs basic validation by only processing files that start with digits and skips known metadata files, but it does not sanitize the content of the markdown files themselves.
- [SAFE]: The skill follows security best practices for secret management by requiring the
GEMINI_API_KEYto be provided via environment variables rather than hardcoding credentials. All external dependencies (google-genai, Pillow) are well-known, standard libraries.
Audit Metadata