planning-with-files-zht
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses automated hooks to inject file content into the agent's prompt context. The
PreToolUsehook inSKILL.mdrunscat task_plan.md, placing the file's content directly into the context before every tool invocation. This represents a significant surface for Indirect Prompt Injection if the file contains data from untrusted sources. - Ingestion points:
task_plan.md,findings.md, andprogress.md(located in the project directory) are used to store project data and are read by the agent or injected via hooks. - Boundary markers: The hook uses
---BEGIN PLAN DATA---and---END PLAN DATA---as delimiters. - Capability inventory: The skill allows
Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Glob, andGreptools, providing high-privilege interaction with the local filesystem. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or instruction filtering for the content injected from
task_plan.mdinto the active prompt context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
Stophook inSKILL.mdperforms a recursive search in the~/.claude/plugins/cachedirectory to find and execute files namedcheck-complete.ps1orcheck-complete.sh. Executing files found dynamically through filesystem traversal poses a security risk if an attacker can influence the contents of the cache directory. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The script
scripts/session-catchup.pyreads session metadata and conversation history from~/.claude/projects/and~/.codex/sessions. While intended for context restoration, this script processes sensitive conversation logs and outputs them back into the active session.
Audit Metadata