personize-agent-workspace
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data to extract structured workspace entries.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
client.ai.promptcalls inrecipes/multi-agent-account.tsandrecipes/trigger-dev-bridge.tswhen analyzing account signals. - Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown headers like
## Workspace Stateto delimit data, which helps structure the prompt but does not explicitly instruct the model to ignore nested malicious instructions. - Capability inventory: The agent can write to entity memory (
memorize), retrieve organizational policies (smartGuidelines), and perform semantic searches across workspace history (smartRecall). - Sanitization: While
recipes/helpers.tsincludes asafeParseJSONfunction to handle markdown formatting, there is no semantic sanitization or validation of the extracted content to prevent malicious data from influencing agent behavior. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits data to
https://agent.personize.aito perform its core functions of memory storage and retrieval. - Evidence: Reference files (e.g.,
reference/api-examples.md) and recipes (e.g.,recipes/quickstart.ts) use the Personize API to synchronize workspace state. - Context: These network operations target the official infrastructure of the vendor and are necessary for the skill's primary purpose of cross-agent coordination.
Audit Metadata